The problem
The error is in our proof of Lemma 4.6, which is the main driver behind our assertion that order m exchangeable equilibria exist (Theorem 4.7). Of course they do exist; this is the main benefit of setting out to prove something you already know to be true. To our knowledge everything before and after this step remains unaffected, but this is an important step in the middle of the proof and logically it must be patched if we are to reach the desired conclusion.
The particular problem is our implicit use of the "fact" below. In the incorrect proof of Lemma 4.6 of [5] , this "fact" was applied with Ξ m Γ in place of Γ and appropriate choices of σ ∈ ∆ Π G×Sm (Ξ m Γ) and τ ∈ ∆ Π G×Sm (Π m Γ).
"Fact" 1. Let σ, τ ∈ ∆ Π (Γ) be two strategy profiles such that σ i is payoff equivalent to τ i in Γ for all i. Then σ and τ are payoff equivalent when viewed as strategies for the maximizer in the associated zero-sum game Γ 0 .
This may sound reasonable at first because it seems that the difference between payoffequivalent strategies should not be game-theoretically significant. In fact it is false! And not just for odd counterexamples: it is false generically. Example 2. To see how this can fail, let Γ be the following symmetric bimatrix game:
Let player i's strategy set be C i = {a i , b i , c i }. The first two columns of A are equal, as are the first two rows, so a 1 is payoff equivalent to b 1 . Symmetrically, a 2 is payoff equivalent to b 2 . In the associated zero-sum game Γ 0 we have so (a 1 , a 2 ) and (b 1 , b 2 ) are not payoff equivalent in Γ 0 . Why does this happen? The reason is that when we consider correlated strategies, we are interested not only in what utility our recommendations give us, but also in what information they give. While we may not care from a payoff perspective whether strategy a i or b i has been suggested, the two possibilities may allow us to make completely different inferences about the behavior of our opponents. It is this information which may be payoff-relevant.
To see this in action, consider the following two distributions over outcomes of Γ: One can verify that W 1 is a correlated equilibrium, and W 2 is obtained from W 1 by moving some mass from (a 1 , c 2 ) and (c 1 , a 2 ) to (b 1 , c 2 ) and (c 1 , b 2 ), which are profiles of payoff equivalent strategies. Nonetheless, W 2 is not a correlated equilibrium. If player 1 receives the recommendation b 1 then he knows with probability one that player 2 has received the recommendation c 2 , hence it is in the interest of player 1 to deviate to c 1 .
A digression on continuous games
In this section we highlight the complications discussed in Section 1 by looking at how they manifest themselves in the geometry of Nash and correlated equilibria of continuous games 1 . Existence of both types of equilibria in continuous games is generally proven in four steps: 1) discretize the strategy spaces to obtain a finite game, 2) prove the corresponding existence theorem for finite games, 3) observe that an exact equilibrium of the finite game is an approximate equilibrium of the continuous game, and 4) show that a limit of such approximate equilibria is an exact equilibrium of the continuous game.
Steps 1 and 3 are more or less content-free.
Step 2 can be accomplished for Nash equilibria by fixed-point methods or for correlated equilibria by Hart and Schmeidler's clever minimax argument. There is an interesting divergence at step 4: in the case of Nash equilibria it is trivial and in the case of correlated equilibria it seems to require a hairy measure-theoretic argument (see [1] or [6] ).
The difference is easiest to understand in terms of an auxiliary map : ∆(Γ) → R ≥0 . This is defined by the condition that (µ) is the smallest such that µ is an -correlated equilibrium (no measurable deviation yields an expected gain of more than ). Let Π be the restriction of to ∆ Π (Γ). Then Π (µ) is also the smallest such that µ is an -Nash equilibrium in the usual sense.
We can study the map via two different topologies on its domain ∆(Γ): the weak and strong topologies. Two measures are near each other in the strong topology if you can get from one to the other without moving much mass. They are near each other in the weak topology if you can get from one to the other without moving much mass very far.
It is easy to show that is continuous with respect to the strong topology, but this is not very useful because ∆(Γ) is not compact with respect to this topology (at least when Γ is not a finite game) so the limiting arguments do not go through. It is compact with respect to the weak topology and viewing ∆ Π (Γ) as a space of tuples it is easy to show that Π is continuous with respect to the weak topology, hence we get the necessary limiting argument for the existence of Nash equilibria.
For correlated equilibria the situation is different: is not weakly continuous! The argument is essentially the same as why W 1 was a correlated equilibrium in Example 2 but W 2 was not. We can move some mass a little bit (thinking now of strategically equivalent strategies as being quite "close" to each other) and change the information conveyed by the correlating device drastically. This changes an exact correlated equilibrium to a distribution for which is bounded away from zero, no matter how small the distance we moved the mass.
In particular this shows that is not weakly upper semicontinuous. In fact this doesn't matter; all we really need for the existence proof is weak lower semicontinuity. It turns out has this property, but proving it is a delicate technical matter (again, see [1] or [6] ). The fact that Nash equilibria behave nicely with respect to strategic equivalence is what allows us to turn problems regarding mixed Nash equilibria of polynomial games into finitedimensional problems in moment spaces: see for example [2] and [3] . The failure of correlated equilibria to behave nicely with respect to strategic equivalence is captured by the fact that the corresponding problems for correlated equilibria are inherently infinite-dimensional [4] .
A more specific problem
The erroneous proof of Lemma 4.6 claims to construct, for any symmetric mixed strategy y of the minimizer in the game (Ξ m Γ) 0 , a mixed strategy π y ∈ ∆ G×Sm (Π m Γ) for the maximizer such that u 0 M (π y , y) = 0. Furthermore, the construction implicitly claims that such a π y can be found which does not depend on the utilities of Γ (as is the case in [1] ) and which is rational in y. That is to say, the elements of π y are in the field generated by the elements of y over Q. For simplicity we will write π y ∈ Q[y]. Let us see how rationality of π y follows from the proof of Lemma 4.6. First note that a finite zero-sum game has a maximin strategy which is rational in the utilities, because the set of maximin strategies is a polytope defined by inequalities with coefficients linear in the utilities. Therefore Lemmas 2.15 and 3.8 show that the certificates π y constructed in Hart and Schmeidler's proof of the existence of correlated equilibria and our proof of the existence of exchangeable equilibria are in Q[y]. But Lemma 4.6 claims to construct the certificate π y for order m exchangeable equilibria by taking the one from Lemma 3.8 for exchangeable equilibria and replacing it by the product of its marginals. That is to say, we are taking the image of a tuple of elements of Q[y] under a polynomial map, and so we end up with another tuple π y ∈ Q[y].
Example 3. In fact such a π y need not exist for order m exchangeable equilibria, as the following example due to Sergiu Hart shows. Consider the symmetric bimatrix game Γ and its contracted second power Ξ 2 Γ shown in Table 1 . Suppose the minimizer plays the mixed strategy y α,β which assigns probability α to 00 → 01 and 00 → 10 and probability β to 11 → 01 and 11 → 10 for each player, so we have 4(α + β) = 1.
To have π y α,β ∈ ∆ Z 2 ×S 2 (Π 2 Γ) means that π y α,β is a product of four i.i.d. Bernoulli(p) random variables for some p ∈ [0, 1]. For notational simplicity we will let q = 1 − p. Then we can compute the expected utility of the maximizer in (Ξ 2 Γ) 0 as:
For this expression to be zero for all r and s we must have αq 2 = βp 2 , so
and these expressions are clearly not rational in α and β. But p and q are marginals of π y α,β and so can be written as sums of its elements. Thus the entries of π y α,β cannot all be rational in α and β either. 
Introduction
Nash's Theorem is one of the most fundamental results in game theory and states that any finite game has a Nash equilibrium in mixed strategies. Despite its importance, the authors of the present paper know of only three essentially different proofs. The first and most common way to prove Nash's Theorem is by applying a fixed point theorem, usually Brouwer's or Kakutani's, to a map whose fixed points are easily shown to be Nash equilibria. The fixed point theorem is usually proven combinatorially, say by Sperner's Lemma [15] or Gale's argument using the game of hex [5] , or with (co-)homology theory, a suite of powerful but less elementary tools from algebraic topology [8] .
The second proof of Nash's Theorem (historically) is algorithmic and consists of showing that the Lemke-Howson path-following algorithm terminates at a Nash equilibrium [11] . In fact this is not so different from the fixed point proof, because Sperner's Lemma is also proven by a path-following argument.
The third proof of Nash's theorem is due to Kohlberg and Mertens and is topological [10] . The idea is to simultaneously consider the set of all games of a given size and the set of all (game, equilibrium) pairs. Under appropriate compactifications both of these sets become spheres of the same dimension. One then shows that the mapping sending an equilibrium to the corresponding game is homotopic to the identity map on the sphere. A (co-)homological or degree-theoretic argument shows that such a map must be onto [8] . Technically speaking this step is almost identical to the proof of Brouwer's Fixed Point Theorem, so the third proof is closely related to the first.
All three proofs have provided unique insights into the structure of Nash equilibria and it is our hope that a different proof, which uses neither fixed point theorems, nor path-following arguments, nor any algebro-topological tools, will provide further insights.
Hart and Schmeidler [7] have proven the weaker result that correlated equilibria exist by a clever application of the Minimax Theorem, summarized in Section 2.2. For games endowed with a group action, a simple averaging argument then proves that a symmetric correlated equilibrium exists (Proposition 2.26). We show that for such games Hart and Schmeidler's proof can be strengthened to produce correlated equilibria with additional symmetry and factorization properties, which we call exchangeable equilibria (Theorem 3.9).
To illustrate this idea, consider the case of k × k symmetric bimatrix games (two-player games fixed under the operation of swapping the players). Let X = {xx
where each type of (symmetric) equilibrium is defined by the set written below it. This definition shows that the exchangeable equilibria are a natural mathematical object. For examples and game-theoretic interpretations of exchangeable equilibria, see the companion paper [16] .
In Section 3 we extend the definition of exchangeable equilibria games to n-player games with arbitrary symmetry groups. The preceding discussion shows that the set of exchangeable equilibria is convex, compact, contained in the set of symmetric correlated equilibria, and contains the convex hull of the set of symmetric Nash equilibria. One can show that these containments can all be strict [16] , so proving existence of exchangeable equilibria is a step in the right direction, but does not immediately prove existence of Nash equilibria.
However, we can use the same techniques to prove existence of exchangeable equilibria with successively stronger symmetry properties as follows. For a fixed n-player game Γ and number m ∈ N, we define two new games Π m Γ and Ξ m Γ, which we call m th powers of Γ. These are larger games in which m copies of Γ are played simultaneously. The difference between the two powers is that Π m Γ has a different group of players for each copy, so mn players total, whereas Ξ m Γ has just one group of n players playing all m copies, but perhaps choosing different actions in each copy ( Figure 1 ).
There is a natural marginalization map sending exchangeable equilibria of either of these powers to exchangeable equilibria of Γ. In fact, any exchangeable equilibrium of Γ can be lifted to an exchangeable equilibrium of either power, and for a symmetric Nash equilibrium we can take these two lifts to be the same. However, for a general exchangeable equilibrium the two lifts need not be compatible, so it is natural to consider the intersection XE m (Γ) := XE(Π m Γ) ∩ XE(Ξ m Γ) of the sets of exchangeable equilibria of the two powers. We call these order m exchangeable equilibria of Γ and prove they exist using a similar Minimax argument (Theorem 4.7).
Under appropriate identifications these sets turn out to be nested as m grows and, being convex, they all contain the convex hull of the symmetric Nash equilibria:
Assuming Γ has a rich enough symmetry group (e.g. if it is a symmetric bimatrix game or, more generally, if it satisfies a condition we call player transitivity), then as m goes to infinity these converge to symmetric correlated equilibria in which the outcome of the correlating device is common knowledge; such correlated equilibria are known to be mixtures of symmetric Nash equilibria (Theorems 4.9 and 5.1). In particular, this proves that symmetric Nash equilibria exist in games with rich enough symmetry groups. Note that symmetry is fundamental in this argument. For example, if we had begun with a general bimatrix game and let X = {xy
≥0 } we would have had conv(X) = R k×k ≥0 , so the exchangeable equilibria (even the order m exchangeable equilibria) would have been exactly the correlated equilibria and we would not have strengthened the equilibrium notion at all. However, there are several ways of turning general games into symmetric games [6] and applying such a procedure proves existence of Nash equilibria in all games (Section 5.2).
Up to the step of taking m to infinity, all the steps of our proof are computationally effective. Papadimitriou has shown how to apply the ellipsoid algorithm to Hart and Schmeidler's proof to efficiently compute a correlated equilibrium of a large game [13] . The same technique applied to our proof allows one to compute an exchangeable equilibrium (or an order m exchangeable equilibrium for fixed m) in polynomial time, even though the set of these is not polyhedral. Computing these is interesting in its own right [16] and may be useful for computing approximate Nash equilibria. However, computation is not the focus of this paper and we leave a detailed investigation of these ideas for future work.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. We begin with background material in Section 2. We cover the definitions of games and equilibria, give an overview of Hart and Schmeidler's proof of the existence of correlated equilibria so we can modify it later, and introduce group actions. In Section 3 we introduce exchangeable equilibria and prove existence of these for games under arbitrary group actions. We do the same for order m exchangeable equilibria in Section 4, introducing powers of games along the way. We complete the argument in Section 5 by showing that the order m exchangeable equilibria converge to mixtures of symmetric Nash equilibria in games with a player transitive symmetry group, and then showing that we can symmetrize any game to make this condition hold. Section 6 concludes and gives directions for future work.
Background
This section is divided into three parts. In the first part we lay out the basic definitions of finite games as well as Nash and correlated equilibria to fix notation. We assume the reader is familiar with these concepts and do not attempt to motivate them. The second part reviews Hart and Schmeidler's proof of the existence of correlated equilibria [7] , preparing for similar arguments in this paper. The third part covers symmetries of games.
The concept of a symmetry of a game extends back at least to Nash's paper [12] . Symmetries are fundamental to the present paper, so we spend more time on these and give some examples. Although we use the language of group theory to discuss symmetries, it is worth noting that we do not use any but the most basic theorems from group theory (e.g., the fact that for any h in a group G, the maps g → gh and g → hg are bijections from G to G). Everything in this section is standard except for the notions of a good reply, a good set, a player-trivial symmetry group, a player-transitive symmetry group, and the remarks following the statement of Nash's Theorem.
Games and equilibria
Definition 2.1. A (finite) game has a finite set I of n ≥ 2 players, each with a finite set C i of at least two strategies (also called pure strategies) and a utility function u i : C → R, where C = C i . A game is zero-sum if it has two players, called the maximizer (denoted M ) and the minimizer (denoted m), and satisfies u M + u m ≡ 0.
For elements of C i we use Roman letters subscripted with the player's identity, such as s i and t i . We will typically use the unsubscripted letter s to denote a strategy profile (a choice of strategy for each player). For a choice of a strategy for all players except i we use the symbol s −i . To denote the set of Borel probability distributions on a space X we write ∆(X). For much of the paper X will be finite so we can view ∆(X) as a simplex in the finite-dimensional vector space R X of real-valued functions on X. For x ∈ X the probability distribution which assigns unit mass to x will be written δ x ∈ ∆(X). Definition 2.2. A mixed strategy for player i in a game Γ is a probability distribution over his pure strategy set C i , and the set of mixed strategies for player i is ∆(C i ). The set of mixed strategy profiles (also called independent or product distributions) will be denoted ∆ Π (Γ) :
For independent distributions it is important that we write ∆ Π (Γ) rather than ∆ Π (C), because Γ specifies how C is to be thought of as a product. For example, the set S × S × S could be viewed as a product of three copies of S, or a product of S with S × S, and these lead to different notions of an independent distribution -one is a product of three terms and one is a product of two terms. This distinction will be particularly important when we define powers of games in Section 4.
To make the notation fit together we will write ∆(Γ) for ∆(C). We may then view ∆ Π (Γ) as the (nonconvex) subset of ∆(Γ) consisting of product distributions or as a convex subset of R i C i . The former view will be natural when we define exchangeable equilibria, which live in ∆(Γ), as convex combinations of product distributions. The latter will be useful when looking for product distributions which are fixed by a group action (see the proof of Lemma 3.8); such fixed distributions are easy to find with a convex setup (Proposition 2.18). Which of these views we are using will be clear from context if not explicitly specified.
As usual we extend the domain of u i from C to ∆(Γ) by linearity, defining u i (π) = s∈C u i (s)π(s). Having done so we can define equilibria. Definition 2.3. A Nash equilibrium is an n-tuple (ρ 1 , . . . , ρ n ) ∈ ∆ Π (Γ) = i ∆(C i ) of mixed strategies, one for each player, such that u i (s i , ρ −i ) ≤ u i (ρ i , ρ −i ) for all strategies s i ∈ C i and all players i. The set of Nash equilibria of a game Γ is denoted NE(Γ).
Definition 2.4.
A correlated equilibrium is a joint distribution π ∈ ∆(Γ) such that
and all players i. The set of correlated equilibria of a game Γ is denoted CE(Γ).
The following alternative characterization of correlated equilibria is standard and we omit its proof. Suppose (X 1 , . . . , X n ) is a random vector taking values in C. We think of X i as a (random) strategy recommended to player i. Given this information, player i can form his conditional beliefs P(X −i | X i ) about the recommendations to the other players given his own recommendation. That is to say, P(X −i | X i ) is a random variable taking values in ∆(C −i ) which is a function of X i . One can then define the event {the pure strategy X i is a best response to the distribution P(X −i | X i ) for all i}.
The distribution of (X 1 , . . . , X n ) is a correlated equilibrium if and only if this event happens almost surely. More succinctly: Proposition 2.5. Let (X 1 , . . . , X n ) be a random vector taking values in C distributed according to π ∈ ∆(Γ). Then π is a correlated equilibrium if and only if X i is a best response to P(X −i | X i ) almost surely for all i.
Nash equilibria correspond exactly to the correlated equilibria which are product distributions, so viewing ∆ Π (Γ) as a subset of ∆(Γ) we can write NE(Γ) = CE(Γ) ∩ ∆ Π (Γ). We introduce the existence theorems for correlated and Nash equilibria in Sections 2.2 and 2.3.
We need the Minimax Theorem at this point to define the value of a zero-sum game. It also plays an important role in our proof of Nash's Theorem. An elementary proof can be given using the separating hyperplane theorem [2] .
Minimax Theorem. Let U and V be finite-dimensional vector spaces with compact convex subsets K ⊂ U and L ⊂ V . Let Φ : U × V → R be a bilinear map. Then
and the optima are attained. Definition 2.6. Given a zero-sum game Γ, we can apply this theorem with K = ∆(C M ), L = ∆(C m ), and Φ = u M . The common value of these two optimization problems is called the value of the game and denoted v(Γ). Maximizers on the left hand side are called maximin strategies and the set of such is denoted Mm(Γ) ⊆ ∆(C M ).
We now introduce the notion of a good reply in a zero-sum game. This is not a standard definition, but it will simplify the statements of several arguments below. The name is meant to be evocative of the term best reply: while a best reply is one which maximizes one's payoff, a good reply is merely one which returns a "good" payoff: at least the value of the game 1 .
Definition 2.7. In a zero-sum game Γ, we say that a strategy σ ∈ ∆(C M ) for the maximizer is a good reply to
We say that a set Σ ⊆ ∆(C M ) of strategies is good against the set Θ ⊆ ∆(C m ) if for all θ ∈ Θ there is a σ ∈ Σ which is a good reply to θ. If Σ is good against ∆(C m ) we say that Σ is good.
The main result about good sets is:
Proof. Apply the Minimax Theorem with K = conv(Σ) and L = ∆(C m ).
It is worth noting that in general a good set need not include a maximin strategy. For example, in any zero-sum game the set C M ∆(C M ) is a good set, but some zero-sum games such as matching pennies only have mixed maximin strategies, i.e. C M ∩ Mm(Γ) = ∅.
The notion of payoff equivalence is a standard way to turn structural information about a game into structural information about equilibria. The proofs of both propositions below are immediate. Definition 2.9. Two mixed strategies σ i , τ i ∈ ∆(C i ) are said to be payoff equivalent if u j (σ i , s −i ) = u j (τ i , s −i ) for all s −i ∈ C −i and all players j. Proposition 2.10. If Γ is a zero-sum game, Σ is good, and each σ ∈ Σ is payoff equivalent to some σ ∈ Σ , then Σ is good. Proposition 2.11. If σ i is payoff equivalent to τ i for all i, then (σ 1 , . . . , σ n ) is a Nash equilibrium if and only if (τ 1 , . . . , τ n ) is a Nash equilibrium.
Hart and Schmeidler's proof
In this section we recall the structure of Hart and Schmeidler's proof of the existence of correlated equilibria based on the Minimax Theorem [7] . The goal of this is to frame their argument in a way which will allow us to extend it, redoing as little as possible of the work they have done. We will use similar arguments to prove Theorems 3.9 and 4.7.
Hart and Schmeidler's argument begins by associating with a game Γ a new zero-sum game Γ 0 and interpreting correlated equilibria of Γ as maximin strategies of this new game. In Γ 0 the maximizer plays the roles of all the players in Γ simultaneously and the minimizer tries to find a profitable unilateral deviation from the strategy profile selected by the maximizer. Definition 2.12. Given any game Γ, define a two-player zero-sum game Γ 0 with C
Proof. Immediate from the definitions.
To prove v(Γ 0 ) = 0, and hence the existence of correlated equilibria (Theorem 2.16), we must show that for any
Hart and Schmeidler actually show that there exists such a π with some extra structure, which we summarize in Lemma 2.15. We will exploit this extra structure below to prove stronger statements in a similar spirit: Lemmas 3.8 and 4.6. These in turn allow us to prove the existence of exchangeable equilibria (Theorem 3.9) and order m exchangeable equilibria (Theorem 4.7).
Given a y = (y 1 , . . . , y n ) ∈ ∆(C 0 m ), y i ∈ R C i ×C i , a good reply π can be constructed in terms of certain auxiliary games γ(y i ). For the purposes of the present paper, it is more important to understand the statement of Lemma 2.15 than to remember the details of this construction. Besides this lemma the only property of γ(y i ) we will need is that its definition is independent of how elements of C i are labeled (Proposition 3.7). Definition 2.14. For any player i in Γ and any nonnegative y i ∈ R C i ×C i , define the zero-sum game γ(y i ) with strategy sets C M = C m := C i and utilities
Lemma 2.15 ([7]). Fix a game Γ and consider
Proof. Omitted. See [7] for a proof using the Minimax Theorem. This proof merits two remarks. First of all, since conv(∆ Π (Γ)) = ∆(Γ), Proposition 2.8 does not yield any benefit in this case over directly applying the Minimax Theorem to Γ 0 . Rather, we have used Proposition 2.8 to illustrate our proof strategy for Theorems 3.9 and 4.7, in which we use stronger versions of Lemma 2.15 to choose Σ with conv(Σ) ∆(Γ).
Second, note that in this case we know that there is a maximin strategy of Γ 0 in the good set ∆ Π (Γ): this is just the statement of Nash's Theorem. However, we cannot conclude this directly from the fact that ∆ Π (Γ) is a good set because of the remark after Proposition 2.8.
Groups acting on games
In this section we recall the notion of a group acting on a game, as defined by Nash [12] . All groups will be finite throughout. In any group e will denote the identity element. The subgroup generated by group elements g 1 , . . . , g n will be denoted g 1 , . . . , g n . For n ∈ N we will write Z n for the additive group of integers mod n and S n for the symmetric group on n letters. We will use cycle notation to express permutations. For example σ = (1 2 3)(4 5) (6) is shorthand for
, and σ(6) = 6.
Definition 2.17.
A left action of the group G on the set X is a map · : G × X → X written with infix notation which satisfies the identity condition e·x = x and the associativity condition g · (h · x) = (gh) · x. A right action of G on X is a map · : X × G → X such that x · e = x and (x · g) · h = x · (gh). We say that an action is linear if it extends to an action on an ambient vector space V containing X and the map x → x · g on V is linear for all g ∈ G. An x ∈ X is G-invariant if x · g = x for all g ∈ G. The set of G-invariant elements is denoted X G . Proposition 2.18. If G acts linearly on the convex set X then there is a map ave G : X → X G given by ave G (x) = 1 |G| g∈G x · g. In particular if X is nonempty then X G is nonempty.
Proof. For any x ∈ X, ave G (x) is a convex combination of elements x · g ∈ X, hence ave G (x) ∈ X. For any h ∈ G we have
where we have used linearity, the definition of a group action, and bijectivity of g → gh.
A left action of G on X induces right actions on many function spaces defined on X. For example R X is the space of functions X → R. For y ∈ R X we can define y · g ∈ R X by (y · g)(x) = y(g · x). The condition that this is a right action of G on R X follows immediately from the fact that we began with a left action of G on X. For finite X (the case of most interest to us), the same argument shows that G acts on ∆(X) on the right. Definition 2.19. We say that a group G acts on the game Γ if the following conditions hold. The group G acts on the left on the set of players I and i C i , making g · s i ∈ C g·i for s i ∈ C i . Such actions automatically induce a left action of G on C = i C i defined by (g · s) g·i = g · s i . We require that the utilities be invariant under the induced action on the right: u g·i · g = u i , i.e., u g·i (g · s) = u i (s) for all i ∈ I, s ∈ C, and g ∈ G. We say that G is a symmetry group of Γ and call elements of G symmetries of Γ.
Note that an action of G on a game can be fully specified by its action on i C i or on C. One way to do this is to choose G to be a subgroup of the symmetric group on i C i or C satisfying the above properties.
Definition 2.20. The stabilizer subgroup of player i is G i := {g ∈ G | g · i = i}, and acts on C i on the left. We say that the action of G is player trivial if G i = G for all i, or in other words if g · i = i for all g and i. We say that the action of G is player transitive if for all i, j ∈ I there exists g ∈ G such that g · i = j.
We illustrate the notion of group actions on a game using four examples.
Example 2.21. Let Γ be any game and G any group. Define g · s = s for all g ∈ G and s ∈ C. This defines a player-trivial action of G on Γ called the trivial action. Example 2.22. A two-player finite game is often called a bimatrix game because it can be described by two matrices A and B, such that if player one plays strategy i and player two plays strategy j then their payoffs are A ij and B ij , respectively. If these matrices are square and B = A T then we call the game a symmetric bimatrix game. One example is the game of chicken, which has A = [ 4 1 5 0 ] = B T . To put this in the context of group actions defined above, let each player's strategy set be C 1 = C 2 = {1, . . . , m} indexing the rows and columns of A and B. Define g · (i, j) = (j, i) for (i, j) ∈ C, so g · (g · (i, j)) = (i, j). The assumption B = A T is exactly the utility compatibility condition saying that this specifies an action of G = {e, g} ∼ = Z 2 on this game. Of course, depending on the structure of A and B there may be other nontrivial symmetries as well. The element g swaps the players, so the action of G is player transitive. ]. Since the equilibrium is unique, any symmetry of the game must induce a corresponding symmetry of the equilibrium by Nash's Theorem. But the four entries of p and q are all distinct, so the only symmetry of this game is the trivial one. Example 2.24. Consider the game of matching pennies, whose utilities are shown in Table 1 .
The labels H and T stand for heads and tails, respectively, and the subscripts indicate the identities of the players for notational purposes. This a bimatrix game, but it is not a symmetric bimatrix game in the sense of Example 2.22. Nonetheless this game does have symmetries. The easiest to see is the map σ which interchanges the roles of heads and tails. Letting g be the permutation of i C i given in cycle notation as g = (H 1 T 1 )(H 2 T 2 ), we define g · s i = g(s i ). Another symmetry is the permutation h = (H 1 H 2 T 1 T 2 ). These satisfy g 2 = e and h 2 = g, so G = h ∼ = Z 4 . Note that g acts on I as the identity whereas h swaps the players, so G acts player transitively, whereas g ∼ = Z 2 acts player trivially.
Example 2.25. Now we consider an example of an n-player game with symmetries. Throughout this example all arithmetic will be done mod n. For simplicity in this example we will index the players using the members of Z n instead of the set {1, . . . , n}. Each player's strategy space will be C i = Z n as well. Define
Then we can define a symmetry g by g(s i ) = s i + 1, which increments each player's strategy by one mod n, but fixes the identities of the players. Clearly g is a permutation of order n.
We can define another symmetry h which maps a strategy for player i to the same numbered strategy for player i + 1. That is to say, h acts on C by cyclically permuting its arguments. Again, h is a permutation of order n. Note that g and h commute, so together they generate a symmetry group G ∼ = Z n × Z n . Both h ∼ = Z n and G act player transitively, whereas g ∼ = Z n acts player trivially. If n is composite and factors as n = kl for k, l > 1 then h k ∼ = Z l acts on Γ but neither player transitively nor player trivially.
The left actions in the definition of a group action on a game induce linear right actions on function spaces such as ∆(Γ) R C and ∆
is G-equivariant (commutes with the action of G), so with regard to this action it does not matter whether we choose to view ∆ Π (Γ) as a subset of R i C i or of R C . Because of the utility compatibility conditions of a group action on a game, the actions on ∆(Γ) and ∆ Π (Γ) restrict to actions on the sets CE(Γ) and NE(Γ), respectively. This allows us to define the G-invariant subsets ∆ G (Γ), ∆ Π G (Γ), CE G (Γ), and NE G (Γ). The action of the stabilizer subgroup G i on C i allows us to define the G-invariant subset ∆ G i (C i ).
The main theorem we set out to prove is the following. This theorem is most often applied in the case where G is the trivial group, but Nash proved the general case in [12] and so shall we. Nash's Theorem. A game with symmetry group G has a G-invariant Nash equilibrium.
To prove this we will use Hart and Schmeidler's techniques in a new way. We will show that certain classes of symmetric games have correlated equilibria with a much higher degree of symmetry than might be expected without knowledge of Nash's Theorem. To illustrate what we mean, consider the following trivial improvement on Theorem 2.16. Proposition 2.26. A game with symmetry group G has a G-invariant correlated equilibrium.
Proof. Apply Proposition 2.18 to a correlated equilibrium, which exists by Theorem 2.16.
A priori we might not expect correlated equilibria with a greater degree of symmetry than predicted by Proposition 2.26 to exist. But viewing G-invariant Nash equilibria as correlated equilibria, we see that we can often guarantee much more. Suppose we have an n-player game which has identical strategy sets for all players and which is symmetric under cyclic permutations of the players, such as the game in Example 2.25. Then Proposition 2.26 yields a correlated equilibrium π which is invariant under cyclic permutations of the players, but need not be invariant under other permutations. On the other hand the Nash equilibrium ρ = (ρ 1 , . . . , ρ n ) given by Nash's Theorem satisfies ρ 1 = · · · = ρ n so the corresponding product distribution π(s 1 , . . . , s n ) = ρ 1 (s 1 ) · · · ρ 1 (s n ) is a correlated equilibrium which is invariant under arbitrary permutations of the players.
Exchangeable equilibria
In this section we prove the existence of correlated equilibria with this higher degree of symmetry, as well as a useful factorization property, without appealing to Nash's Theorem.
Exchangeable distributions
First we need the notion of an exchangeable probability distribution. Our usage of the term "exchangeable" is slightly nonstandard but is closely related to the usual notion in the case when G acts player transitively.
as a nonconvex subset of the convex set ∆ G (Γ), we define the set of G-exchangeable probability distributions
We use the term "exchangeable" because of the important case where the C i are all equal and the group G acts player transitively (e.g. in Example 2.25). Then distributions in ∆ X G (Γ) are invariant under arbitrary permutations of the players. Furthermore, by De Finetti's Theorem 2 these are exactly the distributions which can be extended to exchangeable distributions on infinitely many copies of C 1 , i.e., distributions invariant under permutations of finitely many indices. De Finetti's Theorem will not play a direct role in our analysis; here it merely serves to motivate Definition 3.1.
To get a feel for these sets, we will look at them in the context of some examples. 
In particular, a G-invariant probability distribution must assign equal probability to all four outcomes in C 1 × C 2 . There is only one such distribution and it is independent, so ∆ (The converse statement is false; that is to say, there are probability distributions over C which are invariant under arbitrary permutations of the players but are not in ∆ X G (Γ). This is analogous to the presence in Example 2.22 of symmetric elementwise nonnegative matrices which are not positive semidefinite, hence not completely positive.) On the other hand, an element of ∆ G (Γ) need only be invariant under cyclic permutations of the players.
We close the section on exchangeable distributions with a characterization of ∆ X G (Γ) which we will not need until Section 4.3 but which logically belongs here. The characterization is a corollary of a more general convexity lemma which we state first. Lemma 3.2. Let f : K → V be a continuous map from a compact set K to a finitedimensional real vector space V . Extending f by linearity yields a weakly continuous map ∆(K) → V given by π → f dπ which we also call f . The image of this map is f (∆(K)) = conv(f (K)).
Proof. The extension f is weakly continuous by definition. Clearly f (∆(K)) is convex and contains f (K), so one containment is immediate. By linearity of integration, any linear inequality valid on f (K) must be valid on f (∆(K)), so the reverse containment follows by a separating hyperplane argument (see Theorem 3.1.1 of [9] for details or Theorem 2.8 of [17] for an alternative topological argument). 
Exchangeable equilibria
We are now ready to define exchangeable equilibria. The proofs of the propositions in this section are direct algebraic manipulations and some are omitted.
Definition 3.4. The set of G-exchangeable equilibria of a game Γ is
When G can be inferred from context we simply refer to exchangeable equilibria.
It is immediate from the definitions that conv(NE
There are examples in which all of these inclusions are strict [16] , so proving non-emptiness of XE G (Γ) does not immediately prove non-emptiness of NE G (Γ). Nonetheless, this is an important step and the main result of this section.
The proof that a G-exchangeable equilibrium exists proceeds along the same lines as the correlated equilibrium existence proof in Section 2.2. We again consider the zero-sum game Γ 0 and prove that a certain set is good in this game (Lemma 3.8). The difference is that the action of G yields a smaller good set, ∆ Π G (Γ). To prove this lemma we need the following three symmetry results, which have straightforward proofs.
Proposition 3.6. If G acts player trivially on a zero-sum game, then a set Σ ⊆ ∆ G (C M ) is good if and only if it is good against ∆ G (C m ).
Proposition 3.7. The map Mm(γ(·)) is natural in the sense that if σ : C i → C j is a bijection and y i = y j • (σ, σ), then composition with σ maps Mm(γ(y j )) to Mm(γ(y i )). Proof. By Proposition 3.5 and Proposition 3.6, it suffices to consider only y ∈ ∆ G (C 0 m ), and show that there is a π ∈ ∆ Π G (Γ) which is good against y. Lemma 2.15 states that any π ∈ S(y) := Mm(γ(y 1 )) × · · · × Mm(γ(y n )) ⊂ ∆ Π (Γ) is good against y. By Proposition 3.7 the action of G on ∆ Π (Γ) restricts to a linear action of G on S(y) since y ∈ ∆ G (C 0 m ). Viewing S(y) as a convex subset of R i C i , Proposition 2.18 shows the
Theorem 3.9. A game with symmetry group G has a G-exchangeable equilibrium.
Proof. By Theorem 2.16, Mm(Γ 0 ) = CE(Γ). Lemma 3.8 shows we can apply Proposition 2.8 to
is nonempty. It is worth contrasting the proof that symmetric correlated equilibria exist (Proposition 2.26) with this proof. Both involve averaging arguments to produce symmetric solutions. The difference is that in the proof of Proposition 2.26 the averaging occurs within the set ∆(Γ), whereas in the case of Theorem 3.9 (in particular Lemma 3.8), the averaging occurs within ∆ Π (Γ), viewed as a convex subset of R i C i . By averaging within this smaller set, we guarantee that the resulting correlated equilibrium will have the additional symmetries discussed at the end of Section 2.3.
The latter averaging argument requires a bit more care. In particular, Proposition 2.26 is an immediate corollary of Theorem 2.16 on the existence of correlated equilibria. On the other hand, to prove Theorem 3.9 we have to "lift the hood" on Theorem 2.16 and use Lemma 2.15 on good sets. By doing so we exhibit a correlated equilibrium which we can prove lies in ∆ X G (Γ) instead of just ∆ G (Γ).
Higher order exchangeable equilibria
In this section we begin with a game Γ and artificially add symmetries to produce two families of games Π m Γ and Ξ m Γ with larger symmetry groups for each m ∈ N. Having constructed these games, we can exploit our knowledge of their structure to improve Theorem 3.9 and show that there are distributions which are simultaneously exchangeable equilibria of both Π m Γ and Ξ m Γ. We call such distributions order m exchangeable equilibria. We then use a compactness argument to exhibit a distribution which is simultaneously an order m exchangeable equilibrium for all m ∈ N, called an order ∞ exchangeable equilibrium. We will see in the next section that for player-transitive symmetry groups, an order ∞ exchangeable equilibrium is just a mixture of symmetric Nash equilibria.
Most of the work in this section consists of making the proper definitions. Once that is done, the proofs are rather short.
Powers of games
To define order m G-exchangeable equilibria we will need two notions of a power of a game Γ. These are larger games in which multiple copies of Γ are played simultaneously 3 . Throughout this section we will take as fixed a game Γ with symmetry group G and a number m ∈ N. 
Proof. Both powers are invariant under arbitrary permutations of the copies and under symmetries in G applied to all of the copies simultaneously. In fact in the case of Π m Γ we can apply a different symmetry in G to each copy independently so that Π m Γ is invariant under the larger group G S m (the wreath product of G and S m ), but we will not need this fact.
Since G × S m acts on Π m C and Ξ m C in the same way, we get the first equality. The game Π m Γ has more players than Ξ m Γ, so ∆ Π G×Sm (Π m Γ) has stronger independence conditions than ∆ Π G×Sm (Ξ m Γ), yielding the strict containment. Taking convex hulls gives the final containment.
Since ∆ G×Sm (Π m Γ) = ∆ G×Sm (Ξ m Γ), we can compare the conditions for a distribution π to be a correlated equilibrium of Π m Γ or Ξ m Γ. We use the notation and terminology introduced for Proposition 2.5 to do so. 
Proof. We use Proposition 4.3. If X 
. Projecting the order m exchangeable equilibria into ∆ G (Γ) for all m ∈ N we obtain
This raises two natural questions: can we prove directly that ∞ m=1 proj(XE m G (Γ)) is nonempty? and does this intersection equal conv(NE G (Γ))? We will take up these two questions, respectively, in the following two sections.
Order ∞ G-exchangeable equilibria
Next we use a compactness argument to prove existence of an order ∞ G-exchangeable equilibrium, a distribution which is in some sense an order m G-exchangeable equilibrium for all finite m. As we have defined them the XE m G (Γ) are distributions over different numbers of copies of C, so they are not directly comparable and we can't just take their intersection. We could project them all into ∆ G (Γ) and take the intersection there as mentioned above, but this would destroy some structure. Analytically it will be more convenient to view these sets within a larger space.
To take the intersection properly, we will transport all the XE 
For the converse let R be a random variable taking values in ∆
be random variables taking values in C i with distribution R i which are conditionally independent given R. We must show that R i is a best response to R −i almost surely. We will do this by approximating R i and R −i in terms of the X j i . For each k ∈ N the finite collection of random variables X j i with j ≤ k is distributed according to µ k (π) by construction; here we implicitly use the fact that µ k (π) is an order
, so Proposition 4.3 states that for any 1 ≤ j ≤ k the strategy X j i is a best response to the random conditional distribution P(X We now show that Γ Sym is a game with player-transitive symmetry group. We will use to denote the action on Γ Sym to distinguish it from the action · on Γ.
Proposition 5.3. If Γ is a game with symmetry group G then Γ Sym is a game with playertransitive symmetry group G × S n , where σ ∈ S n acts by as defined above and g ∈ G acts by g (s 1 , . . . , s n ) → (g · s 1 , . . . , g · s n ).
Proof. Note that defines an action of G on C Sym . Also, for σ, τ ∈ S n we have
so is an action of S n on C Sym as well. These actions commute, so together they define an action of G × S n on C Sym . Note that the induced actions on players are g i = i and σ i = σ(i).
To show that this is an action of G × S n on Γ Sym it suffices to show that the utilities of Γ Sym are invariant under the action of any σ ∈ S n and any g ∈ G. To see the former, let σ ∈ S n . Then we have where we have used in the penultimate equation the fact that S n is a group, so the map τ → τ σ is a bijection. To see the latter, let g ∈ G and let γ ∈ S n be the permutation induced by g on the set of players in Γ. where the fourth equation follows because g is a symmetry of Γ. Clearly S n acts transitively on the set of players.
Nash's Theorem. A game with symmetry group G has a G-invariant Nash equilibrium.
Proof. Let Γ be a game with symmetry group G. Then Γ Sym is a game with player-transitive symmetry group G × S n by Proposition 5.3, so it has a (G × S n )-symmetric Nash equilibrium by the player-transitive version of Nash's Theorem. By definition of the action of G × S n on Γ Sym , this Nash equilibrium is of the form (ρ, . . . , ρ), with ρ ∈ ∆ G (Γ). Notice that for each player i, each utility u Sym k (s 1 , . . . , s n ) is a sum of functions which only depend on s i j for a single value of j. Thus ρ is payoff equivalent to the product of its marginals ρ 1 × · · · × ρ n ∈ ∆ Π G (Γ). Therefore we can take the Nash equilibrium (ρ, . . . , ρ) to be such that ρ ∈ ∆ Π G (Γ) by Proposition 2.11. It remains to verify that ρ ∈ NE G (Γ). For any s i ∈ C we can compute For each value of j we can vary the s i j component of s i independently and it is a best response for player i to play ρ in Γ Sym if the rest of the players play ρ, so we must have u j (ρ 1 , . . . , ρ j−1 , s j , ρ j+1 , . . . , ρ n ) ≤ u j (ρ)
for all players j and all s j ∈ C j , i.e., ρ ∈ NE G (Γ).
Conclusion
We have shown that by studying group actions on games and introducing the notion of exchangeable equilibrium, we can prove Nash's Theorem. To the authors' knowledge, this is the first proof of this theorem which uses convexity-based methods (i.e., the minimax theorem). Previous proofs use path-following arguments or fixed-point theorems, which are essentially equivalent to path-following arguments by Sperner's Lemma. This new proof invites new approaches for computing or approximating Nash equilibria. One can rewrite the existence proof above for (order m) exchangeable equilibria in terms of linear programs and separation arguments instead of the Minimax Theorem and apply the ellipsoid algorithm, just as Papadimitriou has done for Hart and Schmeidler's proof of the existence of correlated equilibria [13] . This shows that exchangeable equilibria can be computed in polynomial time, at least under some assumptions on the parameters. For example, order m exchangeable equilibria of symmetric bimatrix games can be computed in polynomial time for fixed m.
We have seen that in the player-transitive case order m exchangeable equilibria converge to convex combinations of Nash equilibria as m goes to infinity. There are a variety of ways one could imagine "rounding" exchangeable equilibria to try to produce approximate Nash equilibria. We leave the analysis of such procedures, along with the question of which assumptions on G allow computation of exchangeable equilibria in polynomial time, for future work.
The power of these methods suggests that exchangeable equilibria should not merely be viewed as a step on the way to Nash equilibria. Rather, they deserve further study in their own right. We consider several interpretations of exchangeable equilibria and the applications they suggest in [16] .
